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Abstract: Community-oriented policing (COP) has become an important innovation in policing throughout
the world, with variations among countries and regions, and over time. We identify and discuss contextual
factors that determine the formation of COP policies, by investigating two contradictory national COP
policies in Kenya: Constitutional Community Policing and Nyumba Kumi. Our study draws on primary
data collection and secondary literature on contextual factors. The two competing Kenyan COP policies
show, first, that there are significant variations in the nature and content of policing policies defined as
COP; secondly, that the diversified and competing local contexts in transitional countries, involving reform
processes while key elements of the past regimes are maintained, create significant room for manoeuvre
for the actors involved. That enables the formation of radically different COP policies, in Kenya represented
by a reformative COP policy as well as a repressive COP policy. Thirdly, the Kenyan case illustrates the risk
of subversion of core intentions of COP: government actors have promoted COP policies focused more on
information flow than on democratization and police reform. As a result, COP in Kenya has become more of
an instrument for surveillance than a tool for protecting the citizenry. This development demonstrates clear
historical continuities with colonial policing, significantly enabled by the emerging threat of terrorism. We
argue that COP policies building on such criteria are counterproductive and are likely to fail. To avoid the
misuse of the label ‘COP’ and legitimation of repressive policing practices, a common coherent definition of
COP is required—one that at least ensures the needs and rights of citizens and local communities.
Keywords: Africa; community policing; Kenya; policy formation; security reforms
1. Introduction
Community-oriented policing (COP) has become an impor-
tant innovation worldwide [1,2]. While COP originates from
the Global North, it has rapidly become a significant policing
strategy in transitional (post-conflict and post-colonial) coun-
tries. The emergence of COP policies in such countries
has frequently been supported by international security-
development interventions [1,3–6]. COP, as a style or a
strategy of policing that reflects local community needs and
promotes partnerships between local communities and the
police, aimed at preventing and managing crime and resolv-
ing social disorder [1,7] has become widely recognized as a
strategic aspect of police reform processes and processes
of restoring trust in police/community relations [3,7]. How-
ever, there is no commonly agreed, clear definition of this
c© 2020 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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policing strategy: COP has been interpreted and practiced
differently in various countries and regions, and over time.
This has led to the emergence of a diverse set of policing
systems that claim to be COP but differ greatly in content
and impact [1,3,8–10].
Importantly, COP does not occur in a political and so-
cial vacuum, it is heavily influenced by the historical, cul-
tural, and political context [8–11]. What type of COP is
formed when the local context is particularly diversified
and complex—as in transitional countries where there are
transformation processes from a post-colonial to a mod-
ern governance system? Clarification of what is decisive
for the formation of COP policies in such transitional coun-
tries is needed for a better understanding of the formation
processes and the causes of variations in COP policies.
This article examines the formation of COP policies in
one transitional country—Kenya—by identifying and dis-
cussing a set of important contextual factors. The Kenyan
case is particularly interesting because the government has
initiated two national COP policies that differ significantly
in goal, content, and approach. Constitutional Community
Policing (CCOP) [12] is anchored in the new Kenyan Con-
stitution from 2010, Article 244 (e), [13] and is part of the
reformation of the country’s security apparatus. Nyumba
Kumi (NK) is the government’s COP policy at the household
level [14]; it is aimed at enabling residents in local communi-
ties to get to know each other better and provide intelligence
to the police and the government by applying the colonial
administrative structure. While CCOP emphasizes decen-
tralization and reformation, NK is aimed at strengthening
centralized surveillance.
We ask: how was emergence of two such different COP
policies possible? What are the decisive contextual factors
for the formation of the two Kenyan national COP policies?
What are the implications of these COP policies?
Here we explore how five contextual factors—the colo-
nial policing legacy, security concerns, the objectives of
the police, international interventions, and ideological per-
spectives among political parties—influenced the formation
of these two Kenyan COP policies. Through this analysis,
we aim to contribute to increased knowledge about the for-
mation of COP policies, especially in transitional countries.
More specifically, we shed light on how diversified local
contexts in transitional countries and changes in security
concerns can enable the formation of radically different
COP policies within the same country, and potential implica-
tions of changes in the prioritized COP policy. This knowl-
edge can also contribute more broadly to understanding the
linkage between politics and policing, an under-examined
feature in much of the literature on policing and security
governance [15,16].
The article draws on a combination of a review of the
relevant secondary literature (academic and media articles,
public documents, and regulations) in addition to primary
data collection conducted in Nairobi, 2016–2018. The sec-
ondary data are important mainly for shedding light on his-
torical continuities, and the aim and the structure of Kenya’s
COP policies. The primary data aim to capture relevant
actors’ perspectives on COP policies and the development
of these policies. We have conducted semi-structured in-
terviews with representatives from international organiza-
tions and embassies in Nairobi, government representa-
tives, Kenyan academic experts in various fields, Kenyan
human rights organizations, community-based organiza-
tions, and ordinary citizens in Nairobi [17].
We begin with a brief account of how COP has been
understood and promoted internationally, and then present
our theory framework. Next, we situate COP within Kenya,
including a brief presentation of CCOP and NK. Thereafter,
we analyse the formation of these two policies by examining
the influence of the five above-mentioned contextual factors.
We conclude with a discussion of how contextual factors
have enabled the formation of such widely differing COP
policies, and of the implications of the COP policies that
have been developed in Kenya.
2. Community-oriented Policing
The emergence of COP worldwide is seen as a major
innovation in modern-day policing. However, the COP
concept remains a subject of definitional debates and in-
terpretations. This has led to confusion regarding what
constitutes the approach and activities of COP, as well as
how to measure its utility and effectiveness. As a result,
today these exist a diverse set of policing systems claim-
ing to be COP [1,3,8–10]. However, Skogan [7] argues
that COP has three core elements: citizens’ involvement,
problem-solving, and decentralization. These three dimen-
sions are closely interrelated, and ignoring even one of
them might hamper the impact of COP initiatives. Citizens’
involvement concerns efforts at encouraging the public
to strengthen community safety on their own, but also at
encouraging the police to engage with the public in mak-
ing priorities and tactics, and to heed what the public see
as their problems. Problem-solving calls for identification
of the underlying causes of security problems, and tac-
tics for handling these causes. Decentralization points
to the devolution of authority and responsibility in the se-
curity apparatus to encourage the development of local
solutions to locally defined problems ([7], p. 28). These
core elements in COP have led to widespread recognition
of COP as a relevant approach to restoring trust in po-
lice–community relations. In transitional countries, COP
has become a major strategy for re-establishing broken
links between community and police, and rehabilitating the
police institution in a way that encourages citizens to trust,
interact and support the police [1,3,7]. COP is also seen
as an organizational strategy for transforming the police
institution, and a way of creating new cultures within po-
lice departments [7]—indeed becoming semi-synonymous
with police reform more generally [18]. Police reform is
often one component of wider political reforms, and these
processes are interconnected and interdependent [10], as
we will see in the case of Kenya.
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Previous studies of COP in Kenya [5,19–24] and else-
where (i.e.) [4,15,16,25] have mainly examined the content
and challenges of implementation, in addition to the activi-
ties and interests of international actors [3]. Despite great
variations in the nature and content of COP policies world-
wide, few studies have analysed the formation processes of
COP policies, to get a better understanding of the factors
that give shape to these policies. In analysing the formation
of COP policies, we draw on critical institutional theory and
the concept of institutional bricolage.
3. Understanding Policy Formation
Critical institutional theory can provide insights into the
‘complexity, negotiability, and fuzziness’ of institutional for-
mation ([26], p. 16). This perspective questions the view of
policy-making and implementation as a thoroughly rational
undertaking, where social and technical change is consid-
ered to be brought about by generalizable policy ideas and
neutral scientific reasoning. Cleaver [26] challenges this
assumed rationality in policy-making by applying the con-
cept of institutional bricolage, a hybrid approach drawing
on components from various institutional theories. Institu-
tional bricolage emphasizes that the formation of institutions
[27] is a complex and multi-layered process influenced by
a range of factors. Cleaver draws on the French anthro-
pologist Levi-Strauss’s concept of ‘intellectual bricolage’,
which builds on the idea that people creatively draw on
heterogeneous repertoires in their thinking, but that there
are structures that limit the repertoires and their variations.
Unlike the rational and specialist engineer, the bricoleur is
more of a handyman who makes the best out of the tools
and resources at hand.
The concept of institutional bricolage combines practi-
cal creativity on the part of agencies and structural con-
straints in explaining institutional formation, functioning,
and outcomes. It refers to processes where ‘people con-
sciously and non-consciously draw on existing social formu-
lae (styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social
norms and sanctioned social roles and relationships) to
patch or piece together institutions in response to changing
situations’ ([26], p. 45). Central here is the interplay be-
tween agency and structure in the formation of institutions.
Individuals—and institutions—are heavily influenced by pre-
existing ways of thinking, social norms, and moral world-
views. The institutional bricolage assumes that a range of
historical, social, cultural, legal, and political factors shape
the tools and resources that form institutions, thereby mak-
ing the institutions geographically and historically contin-
gent. It further assumes that multiple rationalities, interests,
and agendas may be involved concurrently. Individuals pro-
mote their interests, exercising varying levels of influence
over the formation and functioning of institutions as a re-
sult of their social position. Implicit here is the assumption
that bricolage is a process shaped by relations of power,
and that individual actions and social structures interact to
produce outcomes that are enabling for some while con-
straining others. Some aspects of these processes are
reproduced in routine practices, whereas other aspects
are subject to negotiation, contestation, and justification.
Cleaver’s concept of institutional bricolage was developed
in studies of local institutions for natural resource manage-
ment in Africa, but is increasingly used in discussing how
institutions and policies change in more general terms (see,
for instance [28–30]). We find the concept highly relevant for
exploring the evolution of COP policies in transitional coun-
tries in particular. As we will show, in Kenya’s transformation
processes from a post-colonial to a modern governance
system, several competing processes have created a local
context of diversified structures, ideologies, values, and
norms. This complex local context makes it highly perti-
nent to analyse how contextual factors have influenced the
formation of COP policies.
In the following, we situate COP in Kenya and briefly
describe the two COP policies, before moving on to analyse
these in detail.
4. Situating COP in Kenya
Kenya is an important economic, financial, and transport
hub in East Africa. Recent decades of economic growth
have also brought increased human development [31], but
the growth is unevenly distributed in the population. Kenya
has a diverse ethnic population with high inter-group ten-
sions, making ethnicity a significant cause of insecurity.
Moreover, economic growth has been impaired by weak
governance and corruption [32]. This applies also to the
Kenyan police, suffering from lack of resources, equip-
ment, competence [33], and infamous for corruption [34].
Many Kenyans see the police mainly as a threat to their
property and security. In some documented cases, police
officers have contributed to crime rather than its preven-
tion and detection [34–37]. In interviews, residents and
community-based organizations in Mathare, an informal
settlement in Nairobi, have reported extraordinary police
brutality and frequent cases of extrajudicial killings ([38]
see, also [39–41]). Police officers have been seen primar-
ily as corrupt and brutal criminals who protect the elite
rather than ordinary members of the public. These condi-
tions result in low levels of trust in the police among many
Kenyans [5,24,42,43].
COP was introduced by the Kenyan police early in the
1990s. Inspired by their South African counterparts, the
Kenyan police initially saw COP as a matter of recruiting
civilians as police reserve officers [5]. During the 1990s,
civic organizations in Kenya established other initiatives
based on various interpretations of COP. Nairobi Central
Business District Association (NCBDA), concerned at police
failure to deal with crime in the business area, wanted a pub-
lic–private partnership, for better security. Kenya Human
Rights Commission (KHRC) saw COP as a practical and
measurable tool of curbing crime and human rights abuses
by the police and the criminal environment [5]. After these
initial COP initiatives, civil organizations have introduced
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further initiatives with varying content and aim, generally
locally initiated and geographically limited; for instance the
Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF) COP
projects in Nanyuki and Kilifi counties in the 2000, and
the more recently Lemelepo Community Policing Project
(LCPP) in Kajiado county [44], as well as Saferworld and
PeaceNet’s COP projects [45]. More recently, the Kenyan
government itself has introduced national policies for COP.
In the course of a few years, it presented two national COP
policies—Constitutional Community Policing (CCOP) and
Nyumba Kumi (NK). These differ considerably in their na-
ture and content, and relate differently to the key aspects of
COP described above.
The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, Article 244 (e), pro-
vides the legal framework for CCOP: the national police
shall promote and foster a relationship with the commu-
nity [12]. Additionally, the Constitution introduced a new
governance structure, transferring decision-making and
implementation powers, functions, responsibilities, and
resources from central to elected local governance struc-
tures ([12], Chapter 11). CCOP builds on this new de-
volved structure in which all county-level security organs
are governed under civilian authority [46]. The County
Policing Authorities (CPA) is the oversight body of CCOP,
and is chaired by the Governor, an elected post. CPA
consists of representatives from various security institu-
tions and the community [47]. Its functions are to monitor
trends and patterns of crime in the county and develop
proposals on priorities, objectives, and targets for police
performance. This includes monitoring the progress and
achievement of set targets as well as providing feedback
on the performance of the police services at the county
level. CPA shall ensure that COP initiatives comply with
the national policing standards [46].
Additionally, CPA shall establish structures to implement
Community Policing Committees (CPC) on various levels in
the county and receive reports on their work. CPCs, from
the county to the local level, are to serve as an arena for
representatives of the police and various segments of so-
ciety in identifying and solving problems, and coordinating
COP activities, programs, and training to promote security.
Civilian members of the committees should represent vari-
ous community interests, with consideration given to gender,
age, special needs, business groups, and religious organiza-
tions. Members can participate in CPCs for two years, with
one renewal. Membership is voluntary, and representatives
receive no compensation for their participation [46].
In 2013, the Kenyan government initiated a contradic-
tory COP policy, Nyumba Kumi (NK) [48]. The concept is
borrowed from Tanzania and is closely linked to the African
philosophy of Ubuntu or Unduguism—meaning humanity or
brother’s keeper. President Kenyatta encouraged Kenyans
to embrace Undugu (brotherhood)—watching out for one
another and informing the police in case of suspicion of
terror-cells [20]. In Swahili, ‘nyumba kumi’ means ten
houses, but the concept is not limited to a fixed number
of households. It represents a cluster of people or organiza-
tions defined by ‘physical locations, felt needs and pursuit
of common ideals’ ([14], p. 3). NK is a policy of anchoring
COP at the household level, focused on getting local res-
idents to know each other and to establish a structure for
communication among residents as well as with the local
police. Each unit should deal not only with security, but
also with youth conduct in general, environmental issues,
education, and cultural matters. Key NK activities include
identifying problems, sharing information among members,
and jointly solving problems that might give rise to crime
and social disorder. In addition to anchoring COP at the
household level, NK also provides, like CCOP, a structure
of community policing committees on a higher administra-
tive level, consisting of Government Policing Agencies and
elected community members from a wide societal spectrum.
However, in NK, officers in administrative posts appointed
by the President, such as chiefs and county commissioners,
are mandatory members of the committees in their areas
of duty, from local to county level. An essential element of
NK involves reporting to higher-level community policing
committees and the police for action [14].
Thus, there are similarities as well as differences be-
tween the two COP policies. Both CCOP and NK build on
the COP principle of encouraging local community involve-
ment in local policing and creating forums for partnership
between local representatives of various community groups
and police. Key activities are problem-identification, informa-
tion sharing, and problem-solving. However, NK is limited
in its scope to the household and community level, whereas
CCOP is a more comprehensive policy that also includes
the institution level, with the essential aim of reforming the
police to reflect community needs, building a partnership
with the community, and improving citizens’ trust in the
police. We hold that CCOP and NK are not parallel, com-
plementary policies, but are contradictory due to significant
differences in their structures, functions, and aims. While
CCOP emphasizes decentralization and empowering the
elected local governance structure, NK is based on the key
position of the presidentially appointed representatives and
is aimed at strengthening centralized surveillance. There
are thus decisive differences between the two.
How could such different COP policies have been de-
veloped in the same country and almost in parallel? What
were the decisive contextual factors that led to such di-
verse policies, and what are the implications of the resul-
tant COP policies? In the following, we explore the major
contextual factors that can explain how the emergence
of these contradicting policies was possible, by describ-
ing a set of contextual factors decisive for their formation.
According to Cleaver [26], historical, cultural, and social
factors create opportunities and impede the actors’ re-
sponses and innovations to changing situations. We do
not directly investigate the decision-making processes, but
analyse the underlying factors leading to the decisions.
In line with this understanding of institutional bricolage,
we analyse how contextual factors have influenced the
formation of Kenyan COP policies.
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5. Formation of COP Policies in Kenya
In the next sections, we will examine how CCOP and NK
were influenced by five contextual factors: colonial policing
legacy, security concerns, police objectives, international
interventions, and ideological perspectives among political
parties. The variation within each of these five contextual fac-
tors provided significant room for manoeuvre for the involved
actors to form polices as different as CCOP and NK.
5.1. Colonial Policing Legacy
The legacy of the colonial policing in Kenya and Africa
provides the cultural, social, and structural patterns that
agencies, politicians and other stakeholders have drawn
on in the formation of today’s COP policies. CCOP and
NK vary considerably in their adaption and improvization
to Kenya’s colonial history. NK has some clear lines back
to colonial-era policing, whereas CCOP represents a ref-
ormation of the past.
The origin of most African police forces, including the
Kenyan, can be found in measures aimed at securing the
colonial regime by coercive means [49,50]. Policing was
part of the foundation of colonial states, and extended the
range of state authority. However, police presence was
mainly in urban and developed areas of white settlements;
elsewhere, the state police were “thinned out” [50]. Lo-
cal African communities were mainly responsible to police
themselves, and colonial policing often relied on vigilan-
tism and other forms of social control [51]; indeed, and
vigilantism still has strong political connections [52]. The
British colonial administration ruled indirectly by emphasiz-
ing the role of local chiefs in maintaining everyday law and
order. Chiefs acted as colonial prefects for governments
that often lacked sufficient powers or resources to work
on the local level on a daily basis. In Kenya, as in many
other British African colonies, a tribal police/native police
authority was established in parallel to the Government Po-
lice Force, to enhance the policing in rural areas as well
as collecting taxes. The native police and the chiefs were
central elements in the system of Native Administration in
British Africa, and a measure for preventing the expansion
of rebellion countrywide, such as the Mau Mau in Kenya
[51]. In 1958, the Kenyan Tribal Police were changed to
Administrative Police [53], still functioning under the Kenya
Police Service [46].
After independence from the British Empire in 1964,
several initiatives have been taken to improve the profes-
sionalism and morale of police officers, and change the
police from the political control by authoritarian regimes
to a more reformed police system [5]. The introduction of
multiparty politics in Kenya lessened the political dimension
in policing by exposing the police system to public criticism
and scrutiny—apparently without leading to accountability
([5], p. 592). Despite some improvements, traces of the
colonial and the post-colonial state are still evident in many
African police systems. The nature and purpose of policing
remain unchanged: to maintain a certain degree of order
and represent the interests of dominant groups or individu-
als rather being an instrument that protects the population
against crime [5,54,55].
This legacy of African policing is the historical context
drawn on by two COP policies in various ways. NK con-
tinues some of the historical trajectories by mobilizing old
structures. The structure of community policing committees
in NK build on the old colonial administrative structure. For
officers in administrative posts appointed by the President,
such as chiefs and county commissioners, membership in
the committees in their areas of duty (from local to county
level) is mandatory. Essential in NK is to report to com-
munity policing committees on a higher administrative level
and to the police, when action is needed [14], with the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President at the end of the reporting
chain. This reporting chain, and the key position that offi-
cers in presidentially-appointed administrative posts have
assumed in NK, reflect the legacy of the colonial era, when
these officers were important for everyday law and order in
addition to gathering intelligence for the president.
On the other side, CCOP counters the colonial policing
legacy by applying a devolved structure and promoting po-
lice reforms. The police are to liaise with local communities
through community policing initiatives and fulfil the needs
of the community: they should serve the communities. The
new devolved government structure strengthens the func-
tions, resources, and power of the elected local governance
structure. Further, the establishment of the CPA as an
oversight body governed under civilian authority is aimed
at reducing the political dimension in policing and improv-
ing police–citizenry relations. Hence, whereas NK can be
seen as a continuation of the colonial legacy, CCOP can
be understood as a measure for counteracting the colonial
policing legacy.
However, Schlichte [49] argues it is not the colonial
legacy alone that influence the institutional outcome. Local,
social, and political structures [co-]determine the form of
organization resulting from colonial encounters. We start
by exploring the importance of security concerns for the
formation of COP policies.
5.2. Changing Security Concerns
In Kenya, two major security concerns have been decisive
factors in the development of CCOP and NK. For CCOP,
there is a linkage to the post-election violence (PEV) 2007
and 2008, which resulted in approximately 1200 deaths and
the displacement of 350 000 refugees [42,56,57]. Kenya
has experienced several incidents of PEV: the post-election
violence in 2007/08 was a political, economic, and humani-
tarian crisis that erupted after former President Mwai Kibaki
was declared the winner of the presidential elections, and
the opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM),
led by Raila Odinga, rejected the results [58]. Briefly put:
this PEV was essentially an ethnic conflict in which indi-
viduals were targeted because of their ethnicity. Kenyan
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voting patterns of political allegiance are based on ethnicity
[59]. The mediation process following the 2007/08 election
crisis led to various reforms that have remained stalled and
derailed for decades, and most importantly, the new 2010
Constitution, which initiated and provided the framework
of CCOP. The rapid development was primarily a result of
the crisis, with broad acknowledgment of the need for in-
stitutional changes, citizen pressure from below, political
coalitions and serious efforts at addressing the problems,
in addition to the importance of international mediation [58].
By contrast, the development of NK came as an imme-
diate response from the government to the terrorist attack
at Nairobi’s Westgate Centre in September 2013. Terrorist
attacks and violent extremism are not new in Kenya: there
have been several major attacks, including the attack on the
US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 with more than 200 deaths
[60]. Mass shooting in the Westgate attacked resulted in
71 deaths, and approximately 200 wounded [48]. The So-
malian militia group, al-Shabaab, which has recruited many
Kenyans, claimed responsibility for the attack [61]. Two
weeks later, the government announced NK as an initiative
aimed at countering terrorism attacks.
Both the terrorist attack at Westgate and the post-
election violence in 2007/08 heavily influenced political
decisions and the formation of COP policies, but in dif-
ferent ways. Whereas the post-election violence resulted in
significant pressure on national policymakers to introduce
reforms, the Westgate attack primarily provided legitimacy
for the political leadership to implement new efforts aimed
at strengthening police intelligence. This indicates that the
development of the COP policies drew on various objectives
and purposes as regards the police, to which we now turn.
5.3. Objectives of the Police
The formation of CCOP and NK seems to have been driven
by two different objectives as to the police. Whereas CCOP
was closely linked to the aim of reforming the Kenyan po-
lice into an accountable service for the citizenry, NK was
motivated by the desire to strengthen the intelligence and
information delivered to the police, to ensure national secu-
rity.
Several police reform initiatives have been launched
since Kenyan independence. However, the police response
to the post-election violence in 2007/2008 demonstrated
the lack of real reform. It emerged that members of the
Kenyan Police Force became active participants in abetting
the violence once it commenced, and were responsible for
more than one-third of the deaths, the victims being mainly
supporters of the opposition party [42,56,62]. Disclosure
of the severe police brutality and the political interference
during the 2007/08 election violence fuelled the widespread
acknowledgment of the need for police reform, with pres-
sures on the political leadership [42,56,58,62].
The 2008 Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into Post Elec-
tion Violence (CIPEV), mandated to investigate the incident,
strongly recommended a comprehensive police reform, and
established the National Task Force on Police Reforms
(NTFPR) chaired by Justice Philip Ransley. The Task Force
emphasized that low police salaries, political interference,
lack of competent police personnel, poor technical equip-
ment, and communication as obstacles to the development
of the police [33]. These elements were not fully taken into
account in the new Kenyan Constitution, but other structural
recommendations are incorporated. The 2010 Constitution
[63] included reforming the Kenyan Police from a National
Police Force (NPF) to the National Police Service (NPS).
This involved merging the Administration Police (AP) with
the National Police under the supervision of the Inspector
General. Also included in the new Constitution was the
creation of an independent police oversight body and police
disciplinary body. Additionally, and even more important for
the development of COP, Article 244 (e) of the Constitution
instructs the police to promote and foster a relationship
with the community. According to NPS Act 2011 [46], the
objectives of COP include establishing and maintaining the
partnership, communication, and cooperation between the
community and the police service to fulfil the needs of the
community regarding policing. The new legal framework
requires the police to conduct policing with the local commu-
nity, as opposed to policing the community [64]. This is to
be achieved by bringing the police and the citizenry together
in decision-making committees, as a way of establishing
knowledge-based policing [65]. To ensure sustainability
of the police reform, a Police Reform Steering Committee
within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination and National
Government was established [66]. These reforms show
how the aim of reforming the police drove the establish-
ment of CCOP, with CCOP merely part of broader reform
processes.
NK was not initiated in order to reform the police, but
mainly to encourage the public to become actively involved
in promoting national security by gathering and sharing rel-
evant information with the police. The police, not only in
Kenya but worldwide, have limitations as regards problem-
solving and gathering information, and need assistance
from local communities [11], further exacerbated by the
rising threat of terrorism, and the lack of intelligence capac-
ity. The NK can be seen as a response to addressing this
intelligence problem, through political legitimacy to extend
police intelligence mechanisms.
Thus, various objectives as regards the police have
driven the evolution of Kenya’s two COP policies. However,
these processes should not be understood as a solely do-
mestic concern. We now turn to international influences on
the emergence of Kenyan COP policies.
5.4. International Involvement
In Kenya, COP has been a central element of international
security-development interventions for decades [5]. Par-
ticularly in the case of CCOP, the international influence
appears significant. CCOP has been inspired largely by
Western norms and values, with the prevailing understand-
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ing of COP as emphasizing community needs, police reform
and trust building. Moreover, the National Task Force on
Police Reforms recommended external donor support [33]
which in 2010 resulted in the establishment of the Devel-
opment Partners Working Group on Police Reforms (DP-
WGPR) chaired by delegates from United Kingdom. In
interviews, UN representatives explained that this working
group had been important platform as regards the emer-
gence of COP policies—primarily CCOP, which is the COP
policy these partners mainly support [67]. However, they
mentioned two major challenges in that connection: First,
in giving priority to implementing NK, the government has
neglected the process of CCOP implementation. Donor
representatives were generally sceptical to NK, not least
because NK policies do not focus on improving the police
as such. They felt that the reform processes of democra-
tizing the police had lost momentum, and that having two
parallel COP models obstructed the introduction of neces-
sary changes in the security sector. A second challenge for
the donor community was President Kenyatta’s lukewarm
attitude to donor involvement. For instance, he wanted to
limit Kenyan organizations’ financial support from abroad
[68]. We see that the international community has been
given some special venues for influencing the formation of
CCOP in particular, but they face considerable challenges,
largely due to domestic political factors.
However, NK also draws on inspiration from out-
side Kenya, but not in the field of international security-
development interventions: NK was originally a Tanzanian
concept built on African tradition [20]. Thus, whereas CCOP
has been influenced by international norms, values, and
interventions, NK is more closely linked to traditional African
philosophy of “brotherhood”. We now turn to the variations
in ideological perspectives on security structures in Kenyan
politics.
5.5. Competing Ideological Positions
In Kenya, there are currently at least two administrative
systems that enjoy political support. Both CCOP and NK
draw on these administrative structures—a major reason
way COP in Kenya has been so hotly debated. CCOP
builds on the new devolved structure of dispersing political
power and economic resources from the national to lower
levels of governance. The new Constitution [63] calls for
mutual relations among the 47 county-level governments,
Articles 189–192, and Article 6 (2), and provides a sharing
mechanism for functions, duties, and services. County and
national governments are to share security responsibilities,
Article 186, and executive powers have been devolved by
introducing the governors’ offices. The governors, who
are elected officials, are the county chief executives, with
responsibility for county development, including the formu-
lation of security policies [63].
Already in 2011, one year after the introduction of the
legal COP framework, President Mwai Kibaki took steps to
extend the old colonial administrative structure on which NK
was built. Article 15 of the controversial National Coordina-
tion Act of 2013 [69] gives executive powers to the Cabinet
Secretary to recruit and appoint national government ad-
ministrative officers in various geographical areas: county
commissioners, sub-county commissioners, deputy county
commissioners, assistant county commissioners, chiefs and
assistant chiefs. These officers are appointed to be respon-
sible for their respective localities, and are to coordinate
national government functions, including overseeing and co-
ordinating security on behalf of the executive in their locality.
The National Coordination Act of 2013 thereby reaffirmed
the old British colonial administrative structure, even though
the 2010 Constitution had dissolved the institution of chiefly
authority. Further, the county commissioners replaced the
elected governors in handling security matters, even though
the constitutional framework vested these powers in the
elected county governors [46,70,71].
By initiating NK, building on the re-empowered old ad-
ministrative structure, the ruling coalition party Jubilee, now
the Jubilee Party, strengthened the political centralization
of power. Control of security functions and duties remained
with the national government, including involvement in secu-
rity policy formulation, which CCOP devolved to the county
level. The minority centre/left coalition grouping, National
Super Alliance (NASA), supports the constitutional arrange-
ment of security structure and CCOP, dismissing NK as
government policy for policing the citizenry [72]. In Kenyan
politics, there have been, at least on paper, politically di-
vided perspectives on the security structure: centralization
of security vs decentralization [73,74]. The former favour
the status quo, the colonial administration initiated by the
British before independence, whereas proponents of de-
centralization favour the new Constitution and its aims of
devolving security functions to county governments, with
a focus on decision-making power and the formulation of
security policies through constitutional mechanisms [75].
These opposing ideological perspectives have been impor-
tant for the evolution of the various COP strategies, as these
perspectives underlie the political parties’ strategies for the
security structure, crucial for the formation of the two COP
policies.
6. Concluding Discussion
We have examined how the formation of CCOP and NK has
been influenced by several contextual factors: colonial polic-
ing legacy, security concerns, objective of the police, inter-
national interventions and ideological perspectives among
political parties. Although we analyse these five factors sep-
arately, they are highly interconnected and interdependent.
In this final section, we sum up the contextual landscape
and discuss how the diversified local context has enabled
the formation of such disparate COP policies. We conclude
with a discussion of the implications of the COP policies
developed in Kenya.
We have noted the great variation within these con-
textual factors, and how these variations have influenced
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the emergence of Kenya’s COP policies. Variations within
the contextual factors are closely linked to two separate
processes. Kenya is a transitional country where signifi-
cant reform processes are underway at the same time as
processes preserving central elements from the colonial
regime have persisted. These parallel processes have led
to a diversified local context with significantly differing struc-
tures, ideologies, values, and norms, all influencing the
formation of CCOP and NK.
CCOP emerged as part of broader democratization and
decentralization reform processes in Kenya, inspired by
Western values, norms and perspectives and largely sup-
ported by international development interventions. CCOP
has sought to counter the colonial policing legacy by ap-
plying the new devolved structure and promoting police
reforms. The post-election violence in 2007/2008 acceler-
ated these reform processes.
By contrast, the formation of NK has been influenced
by other ideologies, values and processes. The ideology
of centralization of the security structure promoted by the
ruling party is central to NK, which mobilizes the old colonial
structure by making membership in NK committees manda-
tory for presidential representatives. This has made NK
largely a reaffirmation of the colonial policing legacy, made
possible by the emerging threat of terrorism and the need
for better intelligence gathering.
In short, CCOP is based on the reform processes in
Kenya, whereas NK draws mainly on the colonial legacy.
CCOP and NK are in different ways part of the social world
they are intended to modify, making them both legitimate
and contested. Moreover, the diversified local context has
provided significant room for manoeuvre for agencies in
the formation of COP policies. As argued by Cleaver [26],
institutions formed through bricolage are pieced together by
groups of individuals in the interplay of structural constraints
and creativity. In the formation of COP policies, actors with
varying interests and agendas have been able to draw on ei-
ther modern or traditional structures, ideologies, and values,
depending on their interests and agendas.
This significant room for manoeuvre has increased
the influence of these actors on the formation processes.
Cleaver [26] considers bricolage as a process shaped by
relations of power, but the negotiations and importance of
power in the institutional formation are often invisible and
hidden. However, that is not the case with the formation
of COP policies in Kenya. Particularly evident is the use
of power by the President and the ruling party to subvert
CCOP by establishing NK despite domestic and interna-
tional pressure for reforms, and the promotion of CCOP
in the new Constitution. On the one hand, this indicates
that the real influence of international society on the govern-
ment’s preferred COP policy has been limited. The Kenyan
government’s involvement of international representatives
emerges as what Hills [54] describes as ‘tactical conces-
sions or gesture to donors on the part of political elites’.
On the other hand, this shows the significant willingness of
the national president and the ruling party to use power to
prioritize NK. The emerging threat of terrorism and the need
to strengthen police intelligence might have been significant
factors, as some have claimed. However, the emergence of
NK also appears closely related to the desire to retain con-
trol of the security apparatus. Historically, in many African
countries there has been a lack of willingness on the part
of the president and government to decentralize state secu-
rity structures [42,49,50,54]. The ruling party in Kenya has
argued for centralization of security, and the initiation of NK
and adjustment of associated regulations can be seen as a
continuation of earlier practices of maintaining centralized
control over the state security apparatus. Evidently, the
Kenyan President and the ruling party see COP as an im-
portant tool for maintaining control of the national security
apparatus, and are willing to use considerable power in
order to develop a COP policy that can ensure that they
ruling party preserves control.
Finally, what are the implications of the formation of two
mutually contradictory COP policies in Kenya? First, we
note that the level of innovation of COP policies and to what
extent they address underlying challenges has varied sig-
nificantly. To a great extent, CCOP promotes reformation
of the previous security apparatus, and seeks to address
several major institutional, cultural and structural concerns.
By contrast, NK represents primarily a continuation of the
past. Only to a minor extent does it promote innovation,
alternation and improvisation. The Kenyan government’s
prioritization of NK instead of implementing CCOP has in
effect subverted the reform processes so basic to CCOP.
The result has been a shift in the aims of COP, from long-
term goals like reforming the security system by addressing
major problems, to short-term goals like strengthening se-
curity by increased surveillance and information flow. With
this emphasis on NK, COP in Kenya has become more
of an instrument of surveillance than a tool for protecting
the citizenry. We hold that, in a transitional country like
Kenya, with fundamental institutional challenges and limited
trust between the police and the citizenry, COP policies
that do not address the main challenges will necessarily
be counterproductive, and end up failing due to their own
limitations.
Further, one consequence of the various opportunities
to influence the bricolage processes between different ac-
tors can be unfair outcomes for different groups, with the
reproduction and reinforcement of social inequalities [26].
In Kenya, such implications are indeed evident. As noted,
NK has become an important tool for maintaining control
of the national security apparatus. Kenyan academicians
have also criticized NK for being a system of surveillance
of the citizenry [19,20,22,23]. Moreover, persons of other
ethnicity and/or political affiliation than the ruling party are
particularly sceptical to NK, which they see as an instru-
ment for intelligence gathering, a means for the president
and his supporters to place opponents under surveillance
[76]. Thus, we find that implementation of NK affirms that
COP in Kenya, as in other African countries [25], tends
to reproduce existing power structures, and consolidate
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state authority in areas where the institutions of the central
government are weak. This can result in the reproduction
and reinforcement of social inequalities and insecurity, in
addition to obstructing COP policies aimed at reforming the
security apparatus and at improving the trust between the
citizenry and the police.
Lastly, we have shown how mutually contradictory COP
policies can be developed within the same country almost
simultaneously, due to diversified local contexts and com-
peting interests. The COP policies developed in Kenya
also stand as clear examples of the significant variations
of policing policies that get defined under the “COP um-
brella”. CCOP promotes decentralizing and police reform
and generally represents the prevailing understanding of
COP as a strategy for citizens’ involvement, problem solving
and decentralization [7], that can lead to police reform and
improved police/community relations [3,7]. By contrast, NK
is a centralized and repressive policy far less in line with
this prevailing understanding of COP: indeed, it subverts
core intentions of COP. And yet, the government still claims
that NK is a COP policy. That this possible is due largely to
the lack of a commonly agreed, clear definition of COP: it
offers significant room for defining highly differing policing
initiatives as ‘COP’– including policing initiatives that largely
subvert main principles. Indeed, COP, as an international
concept with strong positive connotations, may be attrac-
tive to use in connection with governmental policies and
practices aimed at strengthening legitimacy.
There are good reasons to assume that, also in other
countries, repressive policing policies and practices empha-
sizing surveillance and intelligence gathering are presented
as COP, which are not in accordance with the prevailing
understanding of COP. Particularly in transitional countries,
historical legacies may provide the structures, traditions
and ideological discourse for developing repressive policing
policies and practices—as the Kenyan case has shown.
Further, the growing threat of terrorism and the govern-
ment’s need for information gathering may further enable
and legitimate the emergence of such policing policies and
practices. This shows the importance of clarifying the con-
cept of COP—for academic purposes, but not least for
policy formation and practice. What is required, as a min-
imum, is a clear and agreed definition of COP that can
ensure the needs and rights of the common people and
local communities. This can prevent the COP label from
being misused to legitimize repressive political practices.
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